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ABSTRACT
In this paper we study a behavioral model of conﬂict that provides a basis for choosing
certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conﬂict. We show that a suitable mono-
tonetransformoftheequilibriumlevelofconﬂictcanbeproxiedbyalinearfunctionof
the Gini coefﬁcient, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a speciﬁc
measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study a behavioral model of conﬂict that provides a basis for choosing
certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conﬂict. We show that a suitable mono-
tonetransformoftheequilibriumlevelofconﬂictcanbeproxiedbyalinearfunctionof
the Gini coefﬁcient, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a speciﬁc
measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray.
Income inequality has been always viewed as closely related to conﬂict. In the Intro-
duction of his celebrated book “On Income Inequality”, Sen (1973) asserts that “the
relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one”. Early empirical stud-
ies on the role of inequality in explaining civil conﬂict have focussed on the personal
distribution of income or of landownership.
2
Contemporary literature has shifted the emphasis from class to ethnic conﬂict. Here
too the initial presumption has been that ethnic diversity is a key factor for ethnic con-
ﬂict. Easterly and Levine (1997) used the index of fractionalization as a measure of di-
versity, and the measure has been used in several different empirical studies of conﬂict
(see, e.g., Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2004, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, and Miguel, Satyanath
and Sergenti, 2004). More recently, following on the idea that highly fragmented so-
cieties may not be highly conﬂictual,
3 measures of polarization have also made their
way into empirical studies of conﬂict.
4
These contributions, while loosely based on theoretical arguments, are essentially em-
pirically motivated in an attempt to identify a statistical regularity. The preference for
2See, for instance, Nagel (1974), Muller and Seligson (1987), Brockett (1992) or the survey article by
Lichbach (1989).
3For instance, Horowitz (1985) argues that large cleavages are more germane to the study of con-
ﬂict, stating that “a centrally focused system [with few groupings] possesses fewer cleavages than a
dispersed system, but those it possesses run through the whole society and are of greater magnitude.
When conﬂict occurs, the center has little latitude to placate some groups without antagonizing others.”
4See Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson (1994) for the earliest development of polarization mea-
sures, and Reynal-Querol (2002) for a special case of the Esteban-Ray measure which is then applied
to a cross-section study of ethnic conﬂict by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a). See also the special
issue of the Journal of Peace Research edited by Esteban and Schneider (2008), entirely devoted to the
links between polarization and conﬂict.2
one particular index or another simply depends on its ability to ﬁt the facts. In con-
trast, there is to our knowledge no behavioral model explaining why should we expect
— to begin with — a relationship between the Gini or the fractionalization indices, and
conﬂict.
5
In this paper we present a behavioral model of conﬂict that precisely deﬁnes the links
between conﬂict and measures of dispersion, such as inequality and polarization. The
model is general, in that it allows for conﬂict over both divisible private goods and
(group-based) public goods.
6 It is also general in that it allows for varying degrees
of within-group cohesion, running the gamut from individualistic decisions (as in the
voluntary contributions model) all the way to choices imposed by benevolent group
leaders. Our main result is that a particular monotone transform of the equilibrium
level conﬂict can be proxied by a weighted average of a particular inequality measure
(the Gini coefﬁcient), the fractionalization index used by Easterly and Levine and oth-
ers, and a particular polarization measure from the class axiomatized by Esteban and
Ray (1994). Moreover, the weights depend in a precise way on two parameters: the
“degree of publicness” of the prize and the extent of intra-group “cohesion”. In par-
ticular, our result suggests that if our derived equation were to be taken to the data,
the estimated coefﬁcients would be informative regarding these parameters.
While we link the severity of conﬂict to these measures, our paper does not address the
issue of conﬂict onset. As discussed in Esteban and Ray (2008a), the knowledge of the
costs of open conﬂict may act as a deterrent. For this reason we argue there that the
relationship between conﬂict onset and the factors determining the intensity of conﬂict
may not be monotonic. This issue is not contemplated here: we assume that society is
in a state of conﬂict throughout.
We organize this paper as follows. Section 2 provides a very brief presentation of the
basic measures of inequality and polarization. Section 3 develops a game-theoretic
5Esteban and Ray (1999) do discuss the possible links between polarization and equilibrium con-
ﬂict in a model of strategic behavior. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) also derive a measure of
polarization from a rent-seeking game.
6The speciﬁc formulation is borrowed from Esteban and Ray (2001).3
model of conﬂict and some of its basic properties. The main result is obtained in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 studies the accuracy of our approximation. Section 6 discusses the
nature of the result and shows that it holds in a broader context. Section 7 concludes.
2. INEQUALITY AND POLARIZATION
Suppose that population is distributed over m groups, with ni being the share of the
population belonging to group i. Denote by ij the “distance” between groups i and j
(more on this below). Fix the location of any given group i and compute the average
distance to the other locations. The Gini index G is the average of these distances as
we take each location in the support as a reference point.









We haven’t been very speciﬁc about the distance ij. When groups are identiﬁed by
their income, ij could be the absolute or relative value of the income difference be-
tween i and j. However, in principle we could apply this index to distributions over
political, ethnic or religious groups. Unfortunately, in most cases where distance is
non-monetary the available information does not permit a reasonable estimate of ij.
This is why it is common to assume (sometimes implicitly) that ij = 1 for all i 6= j






It captures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different
7The properties of the Gini index are well known. Its ﬁrst axiomatization is due to Thon (1982).
8The Gini is typically renormalized by mean distance; this makes no difference to the current
exposition.4
groups. As mentioned before, this measure has been used to link ethnolinguistic di-
versity to conﬂict, public goods provision, or growth.
9 At the same time, we know of
no behavioral model of conﬂict that explicitly establishes a link between conﬂict and
inequality (or fractionalization).
Esteban and Ray (1994) introduce the notion of polarization as an appropriate indicator
for conﬂict.
10 Their approach is founded on the postulate that group “identiﬁcation”
(proxied by group size) and intergroup distances can both be conﬂictual. Duclos, Es-
teban and Ray (2004) work with density functions over a space of characteristics to









i njij; for  2 [0:25;1]
An additional axiom, introduced and discussed by Esteban and Ray (1994), pins down
the value of  at 1:








Because (4) is not derived formally for the model studied in Duclos, Esteban and Ray
(2004), we provide a self-contained treatment in the Appendix.
The formal properties of this measure are discussed in detail in Esteban and Ray
(1994).
11 It sufﬁces here to focus on the squared term, which imputes a large weight to
9See also Collier and Hoefﬂer (1998), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Ellingsen (2000), Hegre et al.
(2001), Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) among others.
10Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994, 1997) proposed an alternative measure of polariza-
tion speciﬁcally designed to capture the “disapearence of the middle class”. Later, alternative mea-
sures of polarization have been proposed by Wang and Tsui (2000), Chakravarty and Majumder (2001),
Zhang and Kanbur (2001), Reynal-Querol (2002), Rodr´ ıguez and Salas (2002), and Esteban, Grad´ ın and
Ray (2007).
11Although in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) groups are identiﬁed by
their income — and hence ij is the income distance between the two groups — the notion and measure5
group identiﬁcation. This weighting of group size implies that P does not satisfy Dal-
ton’s Transfer Principle (or equivalently, compatibility with second-order stochastic
dominance of distance distributions). In this fundamental aspect it behaves differently
from Lorenz-consistent inequality measures. In particular, P attains its maximum at a
symmetric bimodal distribution.
As in the case of fractionalization, a situation of particular relevance is one in which
group distances are binary: ij = 1 for all j 6= i and ii = 0. In this case P reduces to






This is the measure of polarization proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002).
3. A MODEL OF CONFLICT
We wish to explore the relationship between the measures described in the previous
section and the equilibrium level of conﬂict attained in a behavioral model in which
agents optimally choose the amount of resources to expend in conﬂict.
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3.1. Public and Private Goods. Consider a society composed of individuals situated
in m groups. Let Ni be the number of individuals in group i, and N the total number
of individuals, so that
Pm
i=1 Ni = N. These groups are assumed to contest a budget
with per capita value normalized to unity. We shall suppose that a fraction  of this
budget is available to produce society-wide public goods. One of the groups will get
to control the mix of public goods (as described below), but it is assumed that  is
of polarization can be naturally adapted to the case of “social polarization”. Duclos, Esteban and Ray
(2004) consider the case of “pure social polarization”, in which income plays no role in group identity
or inter-group alienation. For that case they propose (4) as the appropriate polarization measure (pp.
1759) with ij interpreted as the alienation felt by an individual of group i with respect to a member of
group j.
12We build on the model of conﬂict in Esteban and Ray (1999).6
given. The remaining fraction, 1   , can be privately divided, and once again the
“winning” group can seize these resources.
13
All individuals derive identical linear payoff from their consumption of the private
good, but differ in their preference over the public goods available. All the members
of a group share the same preferences. Each group has a mix of public goods they
prefer most. Using the private good as numeraire, deﬁne uij to be public goods payoff
to a member of group i if a single unit per-capita of the optimal mix for group j is
produced. We may then write the per capita payoff to group i as uii + (1   )(N=Ni)
(in case i wins the conﬂict) and uij (in case some other group j wins).
14
The parameter  can also be interpreted as an indicator of the importance of the public
good payoff relative to the “monetary” payoff used as numeraire.
We presume throughout that uii > uij for all i, j with i 6= j. These payoff differences
deﬁne a natural notion of “distance” or “alienation” across groups: ij  uii   uij.
15
3.2. Conﬂict Resources and Outcomes. We view conﬂict as a situation in which there
is no agreed-upon rule aggregating the alternative claims of different groups. The
success of each group is taken to be probabilistic, depending on the expenditure of
“conﬂict resources” by the members of each group. We now describe this conﬂict.
Let r denote the resources expended by a typical member of any group. We take such
expenditure to involve a cost of c(r), and assume
13This description may correspond to a conﬂict for the control of the government. Once in govern-
ment the group may decide to change the types of public goods provided and the beneﬁciaries of the
various forms of transfers in the budget. But it is not possible to substantially modify the structure of
the budget.
14Note that there is no exclusion in the provision of public goods. These are always provided to the
entire population; only the mix differs depending on which group has control. The implicit assumption
is that a scaling of the population requires a similar scaling of public goods output in order to generate
the same per-capita payoff. Because we hold the per-capita budget constant (and therefore change total
budget with population), this gives us exactly the speciﬁcation in the main text.
15While our main result does not presume symmetry — ij = ji for all i and j — the subsequent
checks on accuracy do assume it. We do not impose the triangle inequality, however.7
[C] c(r) is thrice differentiable with c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0(r) > 0 and c00(r) > 0 for all
r > 0, and c000(r)  0 for all r  0.
Condition [C] is standard except for its restriction on the third derivative of c. This
condition will be used to guarantee the uniqueness of conﬂict equilibrium.
16 A special
case of interest is isoelastic cost: c(r) = (1=)r. Condition C is satisﬁed if   2.
Denote by ri(k) the contribution of resources by member k of group i, and deﬁne
Ri 
P










for all i = 1;:::;m, provided that R > 0.
17 Thus the probability that group i will
win the lottery is taken to be exactly equal to the share of total resources expended in
support of alternative i.
3.3. Payoffs and Extended Utility. We may therefore summarize the overall expected















where ni  Ni=N is the population share of group i.
16While the current model is more general, the argument in Esteban and Ray (1999) can be applied
here, as can their counterexample to uniqueness when the condition on c000 fails.
17Assign some arbitrary vector of probabilities (summing to one) in case R = 0. There is, of course,
no way to complete the speciﬁcation of the model at R = 0 while maintaining continuity of payoffs
for all groups. So the game thus deﬁned must have discontinuous payoffs. This poses no problem for
existence; see Esteban and Ray (1999).8
We now turn to a central issue: how are resources chosen? For reasons that will be-
come clear, we wish to allow for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation in which (at one end) indi-
viduals choose r to maximize their own payoff, while (at the other end) there is full
intra-group cohesion and individual contributions are chosen to maximize group pay-
offs. We permit these cases as well as a variety of situations in between by deﬁning a
group-i member k’s extended utility to be




where  lies between 0 and 1. When  = 0, individual payoffs are maximized. When
 = 1, group payoffs are maximized. Note that k enters again in the summation term
in (9), so the weight on own payoffs is always 1.
We are open to various interpretations of .
18 It could represent altruism, as in the
study of cooperatives by Sen (1966), or in models of voting behavior (see, e.g., Edlin
et al. (2007), Fowler (2006) and Evren (2009)), or in intergenerational models (Barro
and Becker (1989)). But this is not the only possible interpretation. An equivalent (but
somewhat looser) view is that  is some reduced-form measure of the extent to which
within-group monitoring, along with promises and threats, manages to overcome the
free-rider problem of individual contributions. One way to formalize this is to sup-
pose that a “group leader” has as her goal the maximization of the utilitarian objective
P
`2i i(`), while a particular individual k is simply concerned with the selﬁsh objec-
tive i(k). A compromise is achieved through bargaining and negotiation, resulting
in the convex combination described in (9). In this case  may be viewed as the “bar-
gaining power” of the group leader. For a similar shorthand in a different context, see
Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Epstein and Nitzan (2002).
19
18However, it will not matter whether extended utility is deﬁned on other individual’s payoffs (the
speciﬁcation here), or their gross expected payoff excluding resource cost, or indeed on others’ extended
utility. (In this last case we would need a contraction property for extended utility to be well-deﬁned.)
The results are insensitive to the exact choice.
19In these models, the payoff to a government is effectively a convex combination of social welfare
and the payoff to special interest groups, but not because the government intrinsically cares about those
groups.9
We are comfortable with either interpretation, but formally take it that each individual
acts to maximize the expectation of extended utility, as deﬁned in (9).
3.4. Equilibrium. Thechoiceproblemfacedbyatypicalindividualmemberk ofgroup
i is easy to describe: given the vector of resources expended by all other groups and
by the rest of the members of the own group, choose ri(k) to maximize (9). This prob-
lem is well-deﬁned provided that at least one individual in at least one other group
expends a positive quantity of resources.
Some obvious manipulation shows that the maximization of (9) is equivalent to the
maximization of














by the choice of ri(k). To write this expression more conveniently, recall our deﬁnition
of “distance” from i to j: ij  uii   uij. Now deﬁne (for every i and j) ii  0, and
ij  ij + (1   )=ni for all j 6= i, and let i  (1   ) + Ni. Then our individual





Provisionally assuming that rj(`) > 0 for some ` 2 j 6= i, the solution to the choice of








where we use (6) and (7).
An equilibrium is a collection fri(k)g of individual contributions where for every group
i and member k, ri(k) maximizes (10), given all the other contributions.
20
PROPOSITION 1. An equilibrium always exists and it is unique. In an equilibrium, every
individual contribution satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (11). In particular, in every group,
members make the same contribution: ri(k) = ri(`) for every i and k;` 2 i.
20This is exactly a Nash equilibrium, though we simply refer to “equilibrium” in what follows.10
Proof. First observe that in any equilibrium, Rj > 0 for some group j.
21 But this means
that every member of every group other than j must satisfy (11). This proves that in
equilibrium, Ri > 0 for all i, and that for every group i and k 2 i, (11) is satisﬁed. In
particular, we see that ri(k) = ri(`) for every i and k;` 2 i.













for all i. This is precisely the system described in Proposition 3.1 of Esteban and Ray
(1999), with s in place of p. Under [C], the proof of Proposition 3.2 applies entirely
unchanged to show that the system (12) has a unique solution.
When the cost function is quadratic (isoelastic with  = 2), we can express the equi-
librium of the conﬂict game in particularly crisp form. For each i, the equilibrium







where   R=N is “per-capita conﬂict”. Denote by W the m  m matrix with n2
ivij
as representative element. Then the equilibrium probability vector p and per-capita
conﬂict level  must together solve
(13) Wp = 
2p;
so that 2 is the unique positive eigenvalue of the matrix W and the equilibrium vector
of win probabilities p is the associated eigenvector on the m-dimensional unit simplex.
21If this is false, then Ri = 0 for all i so that each group has a success probability given by the arbitrary
probability vector speciﬁed in footnote 17. For at least one group, say j, this probability must be strictly
less than one. But any member of j can raise this probability to 1 but contributing an inﬁnitesimal
quantity of resources, a contradiction.11
4. POLARIZATION, INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT
In this section, we introduce our central formula, one that links equilibrium conﬂict to
a linear combination of the distributional measures discussed earlier. The formula is
not an exact description of the “true” equilibrium outcome, but the remainder of the
paper will argue that it yields a good approximation.
Let i stand for the ratio of group i’s win probabilities pi to its population share ni:
i  pi=ni. This variable captures the deviation of win probability from population
share that is created by the equilibrium variation of individual effort r across groups.
If there were no such differences across groups, win probabilities would simply equal
group population shares. Thus the i’s may be thought of as “behavioral correction
factors”.
Let us see how the correction factors enter into the determination of per-capita equi-
librium conﬂict. Recall the equilibrium condition (11) with ri(k) = ri for all k 2 i, as














































Now notice from (16) that (i;j;) = 1 if i and j are both set equal to 1. With
this in mind, we say that ^ , as deﬁned in (17), is a shorthand for the value of per-capita
equilibrium conﬂict, as obtained in (15). This yields12
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that all behavioral correction factors are neglected; i.e., set equal to
1. Then the resulting shorthand for equilibrium per-capita conﬂict is determined by a combi-
nation of the three distributional measures G, P and F as follows:
(18) ^ c
0(^ ) = !1 + !2G + [P + (1   )F];
where !1  (1   )(1   )(m   1)=N, !2  (1   )=N, and the “distances” used in G and
P are precisely the public-goods utility losses ij = uii   uij.
In particular, when population is large, the shorthand ^  is determined by a convex combination
of only P and F, provided that group cohesion  > 0.
Proof. Given the discussion up to (15) and (16), it only remains to prove that the iden-
tity (17) yields (18). This is a matter of direct inspection by unpacking the i’s and the
ij’s in (17).
The proposition states that provided we can neglect the behavioral correction factors in
the way described above, the theory yields a remarkably spare description of conﬂict.
To be sure, barring special cases, we cannot neglect the correction factors and hope for
an exact equality of shorthand and true value. However, (a) for the remainder of this
section we will treat the shorthand as a good approximation and explain the insights
that it provides, and (b) in Section 5 we will discuss the ways in which in fact the
approximation is a good one.
The proposition asserts that equilibrium conﬂict  is “approximately” the same as a
shorthand measure ^ , and provides the formula in (18) for the shorthand. The left-
hand side of (18) is a strictly monotone function of ^ ; on the right-hand side is a sim-
ple linear combination of three familiar distributional indices; the Gini coefﬁcient, the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and the Esteban-Ray polarization mea-
sure with coefﬁcient  = 1 (see (4)).
Moreover, the weights on the combination tell us when each measure is likely to be
a more important covariate of conﬂict. Speciﬁcally, the weights associated to each of
these three indices depend on the degree of publicness of the prize, as captured by
, and on the level of intra-group cohesion, as described by . They also depend on
overall population.13
The formula simpliﬁes further in an important special case. As population grows
large, the weight on the “intercept term” as well as the Gini coefﬁcient converges to
zero. Conﬂictisproxiedbyaconvexcombinationofpolarizationandfractionalization,
no matter what the value of cohesion, as long as the latter is positive. Thus, as long as we
believe that population size is “large”, the existence of group cohesion matters, but
not its extent.
More intuition and discussion can be found in Sections 5.2, where we conduct some
numerical exercises, and in Section 6, where we discuss some extensions of our results.
The merit of a decomposition such as (18) depends on whether it yields a deeper and
more intuitive understanding of the factors inﬂuencing conﬂict beyond the abstrac-
tions of a speciﬁc model. We would claim that our decomposition does accomplish
this to some degree. It seems reasonable to classify the main forces driving conﬂict
into three categories: group size, group objectives (public versus private prizes) and
group ability to circumvent the free-rider problem (“cohesion” or “identiﬁcation”).
These are precisely the ingredients emphasized in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos,
Ray and Esteban (2004) as the main determinants of conﬂict.
Suppose that we observe a situation of conﬂict in which all groups ﬁght for the control
of an excludable private good (such as the revenue from valuable natural resources).
Then the only feature distinguishing the different groups is their size. There is no
“primordial” inter-group alienation relevant to this conﬂict. In that case we should
expect that the distribution of group sizes will be the most relevant explanatory factor
for conﬂict. Any measure designed to capture inter-group “distances” should have
little to say here. Indeed, the decomposition above with full privateness —  = 0 —
leaves group fractionalization as the sole relevant indicator for conﬂict.
At the other extreme, full publicness brings out the natural differences in group pref-
erences over public goods. Now fractionalization plays no role, and only the measures
reﬂecting inter-group alienation remain: the Gini and the polarization index.
In the special case of pure contests, individuals make no distinction between the dif-
ferent mixes of public goods chosen by the rivals, so that uij is independent of j for
every group i. In this case, P reduces to ~ P, the speciﬁc polarization measure deﬁned14
in (5). Moreover, G reduces to a multiple of F.
22 We are therefore left with just F and
~ P as correlates of conﬂict.
23 As is well known, these two indices, in spite of their ap-
parent similarity, behave quite differently. F is the sum of a concave transformation of
the ni and hence increases with the equalization of population sizes among any subset
of groups. In contrast, ~ P is the sum of functions of ni that are convex for low values of
n — certainly for ni  1=3 — and concave for higher values, around 1=2. Hence, the
equalization of the sizes of small groups will decrease polarization, while the change is
the opposite if we equalize the size of large groups. Therefore, the behavior of F and
~ P in this approximation is signiﬁcantly different.
In summary, what is remarkable about Proposition 2 is that three measures — and
only these three — are highlighted by our model of conﬂict. It is the simplicity of this
relationship which is the main contribution of the paper.
However, we reiterate that this extremely simple structure depends on the (seemingly
arbitrary) restriction that all behavioral correction factors equal unity. We now judge
the accuracy of our shorthand by studying the exact solution for conﬂict and compar-
ing this with the approximate solution described in Proposition 2.
5. ACCURACY OF THE SHORTHAND
Our exercise would be seriously incomplete if we did not examine the accuracy of
our formula. Not only will behavioral correction factors generally depart from unity,
there are questions for which this departure is of ﬁrst order interest. For example,
Esteban and Ray (1999) study the “activism” of “extremist” groups (those that are
positioned at one end of a line in preference space), deﬁning activism precisely by the
ratio of pi to ni. Or consider the well-known Pareto-Olson thesis, which argues that
small groups have a higher ratio of pi to ni, in part because of the higher per-capita
gains at stake. These are important issues in their own context, and indeed our model
exhibits these features, but they are not under consideration here. So it is legitimate
22In this case, ij =  for all i 6= j. Setting  = 1 involves an additional normalization which can be
absorbed by adjusting the value of .
23However, F enters “twice”, once by itself and once as a special case of the Gini. As the discussion
in Section 6 reveals, these two entries stem from different forces.15
to ask whether sacriﬁcing the correction factors can signiﬁcantly alter the structural
relationship asserted in Proposition 2.
24
We approach this question from different angles. First, we explore the most restrictive
case, providing conditions under which every correction factor equals one. As we’ve
mentioned, anaccurateshorthanddoesnotrequiresuchastrongrestriction, soweturn
next to numerical simulations that establish correlations between equilibrium conﬂict
and our shorthand. Finally, we establish a general analytical result on accuracy for the
case of high conﬂict.
5.1. When Are Correction Factors All Equal to Unity? There is a restrictive subclass
of models for which all correction factors are unequivocally equal to 1. In this smaller
domain, our formula is exact. It is possible to completely characterize this domain.
PROPOSITION 3. Fix any cost function satisfying Condition C. Then the correction factors i
equal 1 for all i if and only if the eigenvector of the matrix W with representative term n2
ivij,
as deﬁned in Section 3.4, is n.






Using pj = jnj, ri = i, and wij = n2






for i = 1;:::;m.
Clearly, if i = 1 for all i, (19) shows right away that n is the eigenvector of W, which
establishes necessity. Conversely, if n is the eigenvector of W, then (19) is satisﬁed by
24This sort of shorthand is common in economics. For instance, we use GNP as a shorthand of
social welfare or the Gini index of the distribution of personal income as a shorthand for the level of
equality. In both cases these measures abstract from the effects of endogenous individual choices, such
as labor effort or consumption decisions (among other things). Yet, we ﬁnd them useful indicators for
the complex variables they intend to capture. Sacriﬁcing the behavioral correction factors is exactly in
the same spirit.16
setting all i = 1, and  such that c0() is the eigenvalue of W, and this describes an
equilibrium. It is the only one, by the assumed properties of the cost function.
This condition is restrictive; as we have said, correction factors will generally depart
from unity. But we can give some simple examples in which these conditions are
indeed met.
The ﬁrst example is one with public goods alone (so that  = 1) and just two groups.









If the utility loss from the opponent’s victory is symmetric across the two groups, then
12 = 21, and it is easy to see that the eigenvector condition is necessarily satisﬁed for
any population distribution.
Our second example is one in which all groups are of the same size and the overall
utility losses from rival public goods being implemented are the same for all groups:
P
j ij is independent of i. (The case of pure contests guarantees the second require-
ment.) Then, once again, the eigenvector condition is satisﬁed, independently of the
values of ,  or N.
These examples do highlight the fact that our condition is not vacuous. But they also
reveal just how unlikely it is that the condition will hold in any situation that departs
from these special cases. (However, we later discuss a context in which one of these
cases acquires particular relevance.) In order to illustrate how restrictive this condi-
tion is, extend the ﬁrst example to three groups. It can now be shown that for every
arbitrary preference proﬁle, there is just one strictly positive population vector n such
that the eigenvector condition is satisﬁed.
We can therefore conclude that barring the ﬁrst two examples, it is generally an excep-
tional outcome that i = 1 for all i. At the same time, it is important to appreciate that





















where  is deﬁned in (16). Thus our second approach relies on a numerical examina-
tion of this question. Our objective is to see how close  is to ^  in a variety of simulated
exercises.
5.2. Numerical Analysis. We run a series of simulations based on random draws for
the parameter values describing group sizes and preferences. For each of these ran-
domly drawn societies we compute the exact level of conﬂict , and compare it to our
linear approximation ^ , given by
(20) ^ c
0(^ ) = !1 + !2G + [P + (1   )F];
where !1 and !2 are as described in Proposition 2. We want to verify how closely our
approximation ^  is correlated with the true value . To cut down on the number of
possibilities, we presume that costs come from the isoelastic class c(r) = (1=)r, for
  2.
We also focus (though not exclusively) on the case of large populations. This means
that we can discard from our shorthand the constant term and the Gini index. Inter-
estingly enough, controlling for population distribution across groups, we can also
discard  as long as it is positive. Study the condition (12) with constant elasticity,
using the observation that (i=Ni)   for N large. Then each r
i becomes roughly
proportional to , while the equilibrium win probabilities become insensitive to it. We
can conclude that for large populations,  is roughly proportional to .
Meanwhile, the same is true of our approximation, which states that

  [P + (1   F)]
for large N. It follows that the relative accuracy of our approximation is independent
of  when the population is large (as long as  is positive). This is why in the simu-
lations below we shall ﬁx  at one positive value (say 0.5) in the case of large popula-
tions. The speciﬁc value of  will matter, however, when population is “small”.18
5.2.1. A Baseline Case. Our baseline exercise is the case of large populations and con-
tests with quadratic costs, so that the elasticity  equals 2. By the discussion above we
take  = 0:5. We examine several degrees of publicness in the payoffs:  = 0;0:2;0:8
and 1:0 (we report on  = 0:5 in a later variation). In each of these cases, we take
numerous random draws of a population distribution over ﬁve groups.
 
FIGURE 1. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: BASELINE CASE
Notice that in this case, c0() = 2. Figure 1 depicts the scatter plot of the approximate
and true values of 2. In each situation (and in all successive ﬁgures as well), we plot
the true value of conﬂict on the horizontal axis and the approximation on the vertical
axis. We also use the same units for both values, so that the diagonal, shown in every
ﬁgure, is interpretable as equality in the two values. The top two panels perform19
simulations when private goods are dominant ( = 0:0;0:2) and the bottom panels do
the same when public goods are dominant ( = 0:8;1:0).
We obtain a very strong correlation between the true and the shorthand values for
equilibrium conﬂict suggesting that the “behavior correction factors” do not play a
critical role in explaining conﬂict.
Notice how our formula understates the true value of conﬂict when  is small, and
overstates it when  is close to 1. There is a good reason for these biases and it is con-
nected to the Pareto-Olson argument. When the conﬂict is over private goods (which
is the case with  small), small groups will put in more resources per-capita, and large
groups will put in less. This means that society is really more “polarized” than a
measure based on group numbers alone would suggest. Because our approximation
ignores this effect, it underestimates conﬂict. By a converse argument, we tend to over-
estimate conﬂict (for small values of conﬂict) when  is close to 1. With public goods
at stake, small groups put in less resources compared to their population share, and
large groups put in more. Therefore society is less “polarized” than what the popula-
tion numbers alone suggest, and our measure overstates the extent of conﬂict. Because
this observation is not central to our paper, we omit a more detailed discussion.
Over- or under-statement apart, the correlation between the two variables is unaf-
fected and the relationship appears broadly linear. What is remarkable is how close
the relationship is, and yet how difﬁcult it appears to be to get a full handle on this an-
alytically. That there is no simple relationship between the two values is evident from
the highly nontrivial (yet concentrated) scatter generated by the model. One feature
that merits particular comment — and that persists through all the variations we later
consider — is that the accuracy of our formula improves quite dramatically at high
levels of conﬂict. This phenomenon is closely related to the characterization result of
Proposition 3. It provides strong support for our restriction on correction factors. We
back this up analytically in the next section (5.3).
A high correlation between  and ^  is retained in all the reasonable variations that we
have studied. Some examples follow.20
 
FIGURE 2. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: VARYING UTILITY DISTANCES
5.2.2. Inter-Group Distances. The next set of simulations studies varying inter-group
distances, instead of pure contests. Recall that distances are to be interpreted as losses
from having the other public goods in place, instead of the group’s favorite. We mod-
ify the previous simulation and now permit utility losses to vary across groups pairs
(retaining the symmetry restriction that uij = uji). This is done by taking numer-
ous independent draws of the matrix describing pairwise utility losses. We retain the
baseline speciﬁcation in all other ways. The results are reported in Figure 2, for various
values of . As in the baseline case, the top panels perform simulations with private
goods ( = 0:0;0:2) and the bottom panels do the same for public goods ( = 0:8;1:0).21
The correlations continue to be extremely high and the general features of the baseline
case are retained.
5.2.3. Small Populations. We return to the case of contests (with quadratic cost func-
tions) and now study “small” populations so that the Gini index can have a role. We
suppose that there are 50 individuals in the economy, and consider numerous alloca-
tions of this population to the ﬁve groups. We report results for one case in which
private goods are dominant ( = 0:2) and another in which public goods are domi-
nant ( = 0:8). Notice that with small populations, the value of group cohesion  will
generally matter. The top panel of Figure 3 reports our results for private goods under
two values of , 0.5 and 1.0. The bottom panel does the same for public goods. As
before, the correlations continue to be very high and the other features discussed for
the baseline case are retained.
5.2.4. Other Cost Elasticities. Finally, we explore a set of variations in which we change
the cost function from quadratic to other isoelastic speciﬁcations. We report four sets
of results in Figure 4, all for the case with  = 0:5 and large populations. One is for the
baseline quadratic case. The remaining three are for progressively higher elasticities
of the cost function:  = 3;4 and 10.
Once again, the large correlations that we obtain remain undisturbed. Indeed, the sim-
ulations suggest that as the elasticity of the cost function goes up, our approximation
improves even further. This is intuitive, as a highly curved cost function will lead
to greater uniformity in the per-capita contribution of resources, thereby bringing the
behavioral correction factors closer to unity.
It is certainly possible to try different combinations of these variations. We have done
so, but do not report these results for the sake of brevity. In all the speciﬁcations we
have tried, the shorthand we use appears to be more than satisfactory.
5.3. An Analytical Result on Accuracy. We return to the observation — borne out in
the numerical simulations — that the accuracy of the formula appears to improve for
high values of conﬂict. In a sense, this high accuracy provides strong justiﬁcation for22
 
FIGURE 3. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: SMALL POPULATION
our restriction on behavioral correction factors. It would therefore be useful to supple-
ment this aspect of the numerical results by an analytical argument. (We agree that it
would be even better to analytically establish the high observed correlation between
 and ^  throughout, not just at high levels, but this task will have to be postponed to a
later investigation.)
In what follows, we consider the case of “pure contests”, in which ij = 1 for all
i 6= j. The normalization is without loss of generality as  can be adjusted to capture
differences in preference intensities across public and private goods. We also presume
— but only for expositional convenience — that N is large enough so that we can think
of population shares in each group as a continuous variable.23
 
FIGURE 4. APPROXIMATE AND TRUE CONFLICT: NONQUADRATIC COSTS
Fix group identities and preferences and consider all possible population distributions
over the m groups. Then it is easy to see that ^  must range over some compact interval
[0; ^ U].
PROPOSITION 4. Assume pure contests and a large population. Then for every  > 0, there
exists  > 0 such that whenever ^  > ^ U   ,
j   ^ j < 
for every possible value of conﬂict  under a population distribution that generates ^ .
This proposition shows that the accuracy of our “shorthand” formula becomes ex-
tremely high as ^  reaches its upper bound. The proof of this result relies on the ob-
servation (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix) that at high values of ^ , the occupied groups24
are of equal size. With that lemma in place, the proof follows quickly from the exact
representation conditions established in Proposition 3.
The observation of the lemma is central to the argument (see Appendix for details).
When all prizes are public, so that  = 1, this observation follows from the fact that
the Esteban-Ray polarization measure is maximized at a bimodal distribution. When
all prizes are private, so that  = 0, this observation follows from the fact that fraction-
alization is maximized with equal population in every group. The question implicitly
posed by the lemma is whether the common property of population uniformity (over
all occupied groups) persists for intermediate values of . As the proof of Lemma 1
shows, this requires a nontrivial and subtle argument. The reason is that our formula
does not have any particular curvature with respect to population vectors; it is both
locally convex and locally concave in different zones.
We conjecture that our argument extends to all public goods “distances” that are sym-
metric. However, we do not have an analytical proof of this result (the simulations
continue to support high accuracy at high values of ^  for such cases).
6. DISCUSSION
We have developed a behavioral model of conﬂict and have shown that the equilib-
rium level of conﬂict can be represented by a linear function of inequality, fractional-
ization and polarization. This function does not represent an exact ﬁt, but numerical
simulations together with some analytical observations show that the connection is
remarkably strong.
One might legitimately wonder about the generality of the result. How robust is
Proposition 2 to perturbations of the underlying model? In this section, we brieﬂy
examine how the results might change when we consider different variations on the
model.
Let us review the general picture. We describe inter-group conﬂict over two objects:
privately divisible resources, and public goods. Private resources yield a payoff if the
group wins, and none otherwise. Public goods payoffs are more complex: a particular25
group will, in general, enjoy different payoffs if different opponents get to implement
their favorite mix of public goods.
25
Irrespective of the particular model used, then, as long as there is some cohesion within
a group, the following two points apply:
1. A high component of publicness in payoffs forces inter-group differences in public-
goods preferences to play a bigger role in behavior. Yet, at the same time, the payoff
from public goods is not dissipated by group size. This, coupled with the existence
of some group cohesion, brings a measure of polarization to the forefront. There-
fore the very same features that emphasize inter-group distances also enhances the
explanatory power of polarization. This is why an increase in  increases the weight
on polarization, and it is also why inter-group distances enter the polarization index.
Note that to get polarization to matter, we need both some group cohesion and some
publicness (in the prize).
2. In contrast, when payoffs are private, inter-group “distances” are no longer impor-
tant. With only a concern for private payoffs, inter-group differences are binary: either
you are a winner, or you are not. At the same time, private payoffs — which are di-
vided by group size — dwindle as the group gets larger. The importance of group size
is thereby reduced, and a measure of fractionalization takes center stage. This is why
a decrease in  increases the weight on fractionalization, and it is also why inter-group
distances do not enter the fractionalization index. Note that to get fractionalization to
matter for large populations, we need both some group cohesion and some privateness
(in the prize).
There is an exception to these two points, and this has to do with the possibility that
purely selﬁsh motives — quite apart from group cohesion —might also drive resource
contributions to public- and private-goods conﬂicts. However, the effect will vanish
as the population grows large. This feature is captured by the point that the Gini
25One might conceive of a similar possibility for private goods, with a group experiencing different
payoffs (“hate”, “envy”) depending on the identity of the opponent that wins the private resources. But
this, by deﬁnition, would be classiﬁed as a public goods payoff, and  would be suitably deﬁned to
incorporate it.26
coefﬁcient (with distances) does appear as an explanatory variable in our formula,
but with vanishing weight as population size goes to inﬁnity. In short, the Gini with
public-goods distances can matter only for “small populations.
The virtue of the model we have developed is that it permits us to neatly uncover
these interactions that, we ﬁrmly believe, transcend the particular speciﬁcation we
have used.
We remark on some speciﬁc extensions.
6.1. Cohesion Depending on Group Objectives. As already discussed, the parame-
ter  captures the degree of group cohesion. In effect, it measures the weight that each
individual assigns to the welfare of the group vis-a-vis her own. We have taken  to
be exogenous, while in many situations it may well be determined by other model
parameters. While endogenous group cohesion is a project in its own right, a few
remarks may be useful here.
First, individuals might display different levels of group cohesion, depending on the
particular issue at stake. Controlling for the number of people in the group, the extent
of group cohesion may well be affected in, say, a civil-rights movement, relative to a
tussle for private resources. In short, the nature of the objective the group is ﬁghting
for may have an inﬂuence on . A second argument is that the size of the group may
modify the level of group cohesion, and it is likely (though not inevitable) that the
inﬂuence will be negative.
Consider the ﬁrst point: that cohesion might be inﬂuenced by the nature of the ob-
jective. We explore the simplest case, in which the degree of altruism is equal to the
degree of publicness:  = . Note that this modiﬁcation will just affect the term iij
in (14) and hence the shorthand is exactly the same, with the corresponding substitu-
tions. Performing these changes one obtains
^ c
0(^ ) = ~ !1 + ~ !2G + [P + (1   )F];
where ~ !1  (1   )2(m   1)=N and ~ !2  (1   )=N.27
Now, full privateness,  = 0, makes the three indices irrelevant as explanations of
conﬂict. Full publicness,  = 1 leaves polarization P as the sole essential index. The
importance of the Gini and fractionalization indices is maximal at the intermediate
value  = 1
2. Making  endogenous in this particular way has not made signiﬁcant
changes to our exercise.
6.2. Cohesion Depending on Group Size. The second point concerns the systematic
dependence of  on group size. Fix N, and assume that  = n, where  is likely
negative, though we do not insist on this. Here again this change simply modiﬁes
the term i in (14) and hence the shorthand continues to be the same, modulo the





















Letting (1=N)  0, we now obtain
(21) ^ c















are the general polarization index in Esteban and Ray (1994) — with the restriction
that 1 +  2 [0;1:6] — and a variant of the fractionalization index, respectively.
Note that P() satisﬁes the properties of a polarization measure for discrete distribu-
tionsaslongastheeffectofgroupsizeonaltruismisnottoolargeandpositive( < 0:6)
or not too large and negative ( > 0).
As for F(), this too becomes a polarization index in the Esteban-Ray (1994) class when
 > 0. If, however, we agree that  is generally negative, then F() behaves as a mod-
iﬁed fractionalization index. For instance, F is the sum of a concave transformation
of the n. Hence, given the number of groups m, F is maximized when all the groups
have equal size 1
m. Further, in that case, F increases with the number of groups. It can
be readily veriﬁed that both properties are shared by F() when   0, so that we can
consider F() as a generalized version of the fractionalization index.28
We can thus conclude that under the assumption that  depends on the population
size we still obtain proxies that can be expressed as a function of inequality, fraction-
alization and polarization, although now we will need to use generalized forms for
polarization and fractionalization. Furthermore, we continue to retain the same prop-
erties that more publicness increases the relevance of polarization and decreases that
of fractionalization.
6.3. Costs of Conﬂict. We’ve considered a somewhat sanitized scenario in which con-
ﬂict affects win probabilities but does not directly destroy social budgets. But it is easy
to extend these arguments to a case in which the disposable budget shrinks with more
intense conﬂict. Suppose that the disposable budget is some differentiable nonincreas-
ing function f() of the extent of conﬂict. Each agent k in group i then chooses ri(k) to





Exactly the same arguments apply to show that ri(k) has a common value ri, described










Thereafter exactly the same argument leading up to Proposition 2 can be followed,
with the only proviso that the left-hand side of (17) will need to be replaced by the
strictly increasing function
^ c0(^ )
f(^ )   ^ f0(^ )
instead of just ^ c0(^ ). The variable ^  is still a shorthand for .
6.4. Contest Success Functions. We conclude these robustness tests of the model by
examiningtheimplicationsofdepartingfromthestandardspeciﬁcationofthecontests









for some # strictly increasing. Now, individual resources r are assumed to turn into
“effective” conﬂict resources z, so that z = #(r), and this is what determines the win
probabilities.
Notice, though, that we can rewrite the utility cost in therms of z instead of r. We then






long as ~ c() satisﬁes condition [C], an equilibrium exists and it is unique. It is obvi-
ous that our previous analysis goes through by reinterpreting z as the choice variable.
Consequently, the linear function of the three distributional indices would now ap-
proximate the “effective” aggregate resources per capita expended in conﬂict, ~ .
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have set up a behavioral model of conﬂict that provides a basis for the use of F;G
and/or P as indicators for conﬂict.
[A] We have shown that the equilibrium level of resources expended in conﬂict can be
approximatedbyalinearcombinationofthethreeindices, usingthedegreeofaltruism
and of publicness as weights.
[B] The higher is the altruism the more pertinent fractionalization and polarization are
in explaining conﬂict. The higher the degree of publicness the pertinent indices are
inequality and polarization.
[C] In simulations we ﬁnd a very high correlation between our approximation and the
true value of per capita conﬂict. This suggests that the behavior correction factors do
not play a critical role.
Most importantly, this paper suggests new key features in explaining conﬂict: the de-
gree of publicness in the payoff and the level of group cohesion in individual behavior.
While ours is not an empirical exercise, it is clear that our results provoke two sorts
of approaches to the data. One could take the structural stance of specifying a cost
function, so that the object c0() is well-deﬁned, and then use the formula (18) to
estimate the implied parameters of publicness, privateness and group cohesion. It
should be noted, however, that for large populations,  cannot be separately identiﬁed30
from a multiplicative coefﬁcient on the cost function. On the other hand, the ratio of
the coefﬁcients on polarization and fractionalization is informative about , the degree
of publicness.
26
Under a less structural view, one can treat (18) in a looser way: as an indicator of
which distributional variables might be related to conﬂict in different situations, and
then examining such predictions via reduced-form techniques. We remain agnostic
about either approach.
At a more basic level, one might think of two issues in taking this exercise to the data.
The ﬁrst is precisely what one means by “conﬂict”. Most of the literature has identi-
ﬁed social conﬂict with civil war. To this effect, a country is recorded as having conﬂict
whenever the number of deaths goes above a given threshold (see, for example, the
studies by Collier and Hoefﬂer (1998, 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)). But so-
cial conﬂict need not manifest itself in civil war alone, and there are various other
measures (that incorporate, for instance, strikes, demonstrations, riots, assassinations,
political prisoners and the like). Our model should certainly not be seen as an attempt
to explain the onset of civil war, and perhaps should not be used in such a context. It
may be somewhat better for civil war incidence, but its most satisfactory application
should be — data permitting — as a potential explanation for the broader range of
conﬂicts described here.
A second issue of interest is the choice of groups over which the distributional mea-
sures are to be deﬁned. Presumably, certain groupings are salient in any particular
society, but the model developed here yields no insights regarding the identiﬁcation
of such groupings. The theory here will therefore need to be combined with others that
study salience (see, for example, Esteban and Ray (2008)), or one will have to take the
leap of committing, at the outset, to the study of certain groupings, such as ethnicity
or religion (see, for example, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)).
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APPENDIX
An Axiomatization of the Quadratic Polarization Index. Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos,
Esteban and Ray (2004) axiomatize the following class of polarization measures. Let popula-
tion be distributed on [0;1) with density f(x). The class is given by
P = K
Z Z
f(x)1+f(y)jx   yjdxdy; for some constant K > 0 and  2 [0:25;1]:35
Axiom 5. Suppose that a distribution consists of three equi-spaced uniform basic densities of
sizes r, p and q, as shown in Figure 5, each of support 2. Assume that p = q + r. Then there is
 > 0 such that if 0 < r <  and 0 <  < , any uniform transfer of population mass from r to
q cannot decrease polarization.
r p q
0 a 2a
2  2  2 
FIGURE 5. Figure for Axiom 5.
Intuitively, this axiom asserts that if the group of size r is extremely small, it cannot be con-
tributing much on its own to social tension. If instead the population is transferred from that
group to another group which is “equally opposed” to the largest group of size p (and of mass
slightly smaller than p), then polarization cannot come down.
THEOREM 1. Under the additional Axiom 5, it must be that  = 1, so the unique polarization measure
that satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms is proportional to
Z Z
f(x)2f(y)jy   xjdydx:
Proof. Consider a distribution generated from three copies of a uniform basic density as in
Axiom 5, exactly as shown in Figure 5. The bases are centered at locations 0, a and 2a. Each
has width 2. The heights are r, p and q.
First we show necessity. Suppose that the axiom is true. Take parameters z  (p;q;r;) to
satisfy the conditions of the axiom, and transfer a small amount  uniformly from the r-mass
to the q-mass. Then polarization (viewed as a function of  and the other parameters z) is given
by the three “internal” polarizations of each basic density as well as the pairwise effective36
antagonisms across each pair of basic densities, which makes for nine terms in all:
P(;z) = I()
h








(r   )1+p + p1+(q + ) + (q + )1+p + p1+(r   )
i
;
















(x   y)dxdy = 4a2;






(x   y)dxdy = 8a2:
Differentiating P(;z) with respect to  (write this partial derivative as P0(;z)) and evaluating
the result at  = 0, we see that










q1+   r1+ + (1 + )(rq   qr)
i
:
Substituting the values for I(), C() and C2(), we see that
1
4












q1+   r1+ + (1 + )(rq   qr)
i
: (22)
The axiom insists that P0(0;z) must be nonnegative for all values of z such that p = q + r and
r sufﬁciently small. Fixing p and a, take a sequence of z’s such that r ! 0, q ! p and  ! 0.
Noting that P0(0;z)  0 throughout this sequence, we can pass to the limit in (22) to conclude
that
(1 + )   2  0;
which, given that   1, proves that  = 1.37
To establish the converse, put  = 1 and consider (22) again. We see that for any conﬁguration






+ 2ap[q   r]   2a

q2   r2
> 2ap[q   r]   2a(q   r)(q + r)
= 2ap[q   r]   2ap[q   r] = 0;
where the penultimate equality uses the restriction that p = q + r.
Proof of Proposition 4. The central argument behind the proposition is
LEMMA 1. Under the pure contest and large population assumptions, the value of ^  must be maximized
at a conﬁguration which involves equal population in all groups with nonzero population.
Proof. Use (17), along with the pure contest and large population assumptions, to see that
1





















i + (1   ):
Pick any population distribution with the property that population is unequal across at least
two groups with positive population shares. Without loss of generality n1 = a and n2 = b, and
a > b > 0. Suppose, contrary to our assertion, that such a distribution maximizes ^ .
For any  2 ( b;a b), deﬁne n1()  a , n2()  b+, and ni()  ni for all i 6= 1;2, and let








i() + (1   ):
Notice that A() is just the value of ^ c0(^ )= when the population distribution is (a   ;b +
;n3;:::;nm). Because ^  is maximized at n by assumption, it must be that A0(0) = 0. Differen-
tiate A() to see that
A0() =  2(2   1)[n1()   n2()] + 3[n2
1()   n2
2()]
= [n1()   n2()]f3[n1() + n2()]   [4   2]g: (23)
Evaluating the result at  = 0, we must conclude that




Notice in passing that equation (24) already establishes a contradiction when   1=2, so from
now we presume that  > 1=2.
It is obvious that   2=3, so there exists i 6= 1;2 such that ni > 0. For every such i, ni must
equal either a or b. For if this were false for some i, we would violate (24) simply by choosing
groups 1 and k and redoing the above exercise.
We now claim that for every i 6= 1;2 with ni > 0, we have ni = a. Suppose not; then ni = b for
some index i = k. Permute the labels 1 and k, and redo exactly the above exercise with the two
groups of equal size b. Differentiate again in (23) to see that
A00() = 4(2   1)   6[n1() + n2()]:
Evaluate this result at  = 0, and use (24) along with a > b to conclude that A00(0) > 0. But
this is a contradiction to the maximality of n: a small population transfer of  between the two
groups of size b will necessarily raise ^ . This proves the claim.
We must therefore conclude that n has S   1 groups of size a and exactly one group of size b,
where a > b and S  3, and all other groups have zero size. Moreover, (24) holds.
For any  2 ( b;[S   1][a   b]), deﬁne ni()  a   (=[S   1]) for all i such that ni = a and
nj()  b +  for the single group j of size b. Deﬁne a new function








i() + (1   ):
Note — as in the case of A() — that B() is the value of ^ c0(^ )= when the population distri-
bution is (b + ;a   (=[S   1]);:::;a   (=[S   1])). Differentiate once to see that
B0() = 2(2   1)











  (b + )2
#
;
and differentiate again to obtain












+ (b + )

:
Evaluate this expression at  = 0 to see that
(25) (S   1)B00(0) = 2(2   1)S   6[a + b(S   1)]:





(S   1)   1
S   2
:39
Using this information in (25), we see that





(S   1)2   (S   1)
S   2

= 2(2   1)S   6(S   1)
= 2[S   (2S   3)]; (27)
where the last equality uses the deﬁnition of  in (24).
Now a > b. Using this information in (26), we see that
1    > (S   1)   1;
or equivalently,
S   (2S   3) > 0:
Using this information in (27), we must conclude that B00(0) > 0. But now we contradict the
presumption that n maximizes ^ : a suitably chosen population transfer between the groups
will raise the value of ^ .
Now we return to the main proof. We observe that when ^  is at its maximal value ^ U, there
is only one possible value of , and it is ^ U as well. To see this, use Lemma 1 to argue that
the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for all behavioral correction factors to equal unity (see
Proposition 3 and the second example following it) is indeed satisﬁed. Therefore  must equal
^ .
Deﬁne U(^ ) and u(^ ) as the maximum and minimum respectively of all possible values of
conﬂict , as we range over all population distributions that generate ^ . By a simple continuity
argument, both U(^ ) and u(^ ) must converge to ^ U as ^  ! ^ U, which completes the proof.